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Abstract—Authentication based on keystroke dynamics is a 
convenient biometric approach, easy in use, transparent, and 
cheap as it does not require a dedicated sensor. Keystroke 
authentication, as part of multi factor authentication, can be used 
in remote display access to guarantee the security of use of remote 
connectivity systems during the access control phase or 
throughout the session. This paper investigates how network 
conditions and additional host interaction may impact the 
behavioural pattern of keystrokes when used in a remote desktop 
application scenario. We focus on the timing of adjacent keys and 
investigate this impact by calculating the variations of the 
Euclidean distance between a reference profile and resulting 
profiles following such impairments.  
The experimental results indicate that variations of congestion 
latency, whether produced by adjacent traffic sources or by 
additional remote desktop interactions, have a substantive impact 
on the Euclidian distance, which in turn may affect the 
effectiveness of the biometric authentication algorithm. Results 
also indicate that data flows within remote desktop protocol are 
not prioritized and therefore additional traffic will have a 
significant impact on the keystroke timings, which renders 
continuous authentication less effective for remote access and 
more appropriate for one-time login. 
Index Terms—biometric pattern, continuous authentication, 
Euclidean distance, keystroke dynamics, MFA, remote display 
protocol, RDP. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE ubiquity and speed of Internet access led over the past 
decade to an exponential increase in the use of cloud 
computing and virtualized services, including Desktop-as-
a-Service (DaaS), both taking advantage of the ability to 
remotely provide computing resources, from single systems to 
entire infrastructures. In this context, Virtual Desktop 
Infrastructure (VDI) and remote display access allows users to 
reach their allocated hosts from a terminal with reduced 
processing, memory, or/and storage capabilities. Such a 
terminal, called a thin client, renders the graphical user interface 
of the remote applications and transmits mouse and keyboard 
events from thin client to the server. The network 
communication protocols used to transfer the screen image, 
audio, mouse events and typed keystroke data are referred to as 
remote display protocols. The use of these protocols is not 
limited to accessing the remote host, but also for remote 
administration of servers and workstations, for providing access 
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during conferences, demonstrations, or collaborative work. 
Remote administration is one of the core activities for IT 
administrators today and Remote Desktop is the administrator’s 
go-to tool. Remote Desktop connections are essential for 
efficient remote management and troubleshooting. Remote 
display protocols are a common target for man-in-the-middle 
cyberattacks, due to their widespread use and the fact that such 
connections often have elevated privileges because they are 
typically used to perform administrative tasks. This context 
makes remote desktop security risks a top concern for network 
administrators, security experts, and analysts. 
The typical option to provide security is using a network 
access control method, provided through the identification and 
authentication of the users. In order to enhance its effectiveness, 
user authentication may use multi-factor techniques or the 
inclusion of additional user identification steps. Behavioral 
biometrics, based on free-text keystroke dynamics, tend to be 
the de-facto alternative, as they are promising enough to 
achieve cost effective continuous authentication system.  
Due to their unique characteristics, typing keystroke 
dynamics can be used to create user identification templates for 
authentication. The keystroke dynamics algorithm computes a 
user biometric pattern by using a set of temporal metrics 
derived from keystroke events generated by computer user 
throughout a session [1]. Continuous user authentication based 
on keystroke dynamics recognition has raised a lot of interest 
among researchers [2,3]. Many studies report a high recognition 
rate, and this forms a condition to implement it for remote 
display connection. 
A continuous authentication system based on keystroke 
dynamics and used in VDI may be considered a latency-
sensitive application since the computer display content, the 
pressed keystrokes and the mouse movements are being 
transferred by remote desktop protocols in a similar time-
sensitive fashion as a video streaming service. During the 
transmission of data from the thin client over remote display 
protocol, the temporal metrics of user input might be affected 
by the characteristics and quality of communication network. 
Therefore, it is relevant and necessary to experiment whether 
degraded network conditions may affect the accuracy of the 
continuous authentication system when keystroke dynamics are 
sent over to the remote VDI display. 
The relationship between latency-sensitive applications and 
the Mobile Edge Computing architecture was summarized in 
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[4], with the authors proposing measures such as network 
monitoring, efficient routing mechanisms, and Cloudlets to 
address the existing issues. In addition, at the transport layer, 
Ferlin et al. [5] proposed an improvement to the TCP and 
MTCP loss recovery mechanisms in high delay and lossy 
networks in order to minimize round-trip times loss recovery 
for latency-sensitive applications, such as video-streaming. In 
addition, the impact of network latency on remote desktop 
sessions was studied in [6,7]. As part of the study, the authors 
demonstrated that user experience and human visual perception 
are affected by the VDI technology during capture-transfer-
render phases. Virtual environment represents a specific 
context in cybersecurity dimension of behavioral biometric. 
In our study, we measure the impact of the network 
characteristics and background running applications onto the 
resulting behaviour pattern based on keystroke dynamics that 
are transmitted in the Virtual Desktop Infrastructure by using a 
thin client with a Microsoft RDP cloud access agent. The 
experimental tests replicate the effect of network conditions on 
the packets transmitted between a thin client and a remote 
desktop server, using a number of network- and system-based 
applications to emulate concurrent network activity. This 
environment replicates a typical VDI interaction, including 
emulating the effect of cross-traffic and congestion. We 
acknowledge that RDP is not the dominant market player but it 
provides a simplified, free setup and, more importantly, it 
shares functionality principles with other VDI protocols. 
Given the variety of existing keystroke authentication 
solutions, we aim to observe the generic impact of network 
variations onto the resulting keystroke pattern rather than 
evaluate individual biometric authentication solutions. To 
follow, a secondary aim of the study is to inform developers of 
biometric solutions to consider the network impact on the 
keystroke pattern before getting into machine learning because 
this modified by the network keystroke pattern can cause make 
the wrong decision by machine. In this context, keystroke-
based user identification and authentication are outside the 
scope of this paper but considered for future work or integration 
with enhancement of biometric techniques.  
II. ARCHITECTURE OF REMOTE DESKTOP APPLICATION 
From an architectural perspective, a remote desktop application 
includes a thin client and a remote display server (see Fig.1). 
The thin client is typically a workstation with a remote desktop 
application, and the server is the host where the user 
application(s) reside/run. The remote user logs in via different 
remote display protocols, including Microsoft RDP, Teradici 
PCoIP, or Citrix ICA. For the purpose of this paper, a keystroke 
acquisition component was added on the server for data 
collection. The authentication scheme can be implemented on 
top of the application using its two components, with data 
collection and processing on the server side.  
During the enrolment phase, the collected data allows 
creating a reference profile that is stored in a database. 
Subsequently, every time a user either logs in or interacts with 
a remote session, their keystrokes are collected on the server 
side and compared with the reference profile. In the case of a 
multi-user environment (Windows Server2012, 2016), if 
multiple users are logged in, each user reference profile is 
associated within their corresponding individual session.  
Remote display protocols capture input events from locally 
attached keyboard, transfer them to remote desktop over the 
network via TCP/IP and replay or render input events on a 
remote display to simulate user input. The additional cross-
traffic and congestion affect the timing of the received keyboard 
events. However, the keystroke events sent by the VDI 
software, for example Microsoft RDP, does not contain 
timestamps1 [8]. TCP does indeed eliminate misordering 
through the in-sequence delivery, but time spacing information 
is not preserved through the transmission. While protocols such 
as PCoIP for VMWare [9] or ICA for Citrix [10], may differ in 
specification from RDP, it is important to note that they all 
share the lack of timing information for keystroke events. 
 
Fig.1. Virtual desktop infrastructure. 
 
Another characteristic of the VDI environment is that 
authentication and user access control are performed on the 
remote system, which means that keystroke patterns are 
captured and verified on the remote session computer rather 
than on the thin client computer, as shown in Fig.1. This is 
clearly not optimal from a security perspective, but it is in place 
for two reasons. Firstly, the thin client has reduced/minimal 
functionality, therefore adding processing tasks would be 
against its architecture design. Secondly, the assumption made 
by VDI software implementations is that the initial 
authentication is sufficient for ensuring the security of the 
application. In addition to the processing required for the 
applications they run, remote display protocols also may use 
significant CPU resources to detect screen changes and 




CPU usage varies depending on entropy of screen image 
changes [11]. In addition, the remote desktop server software in 
a cloud environment may share CPU resources among multiple 
remote sessions. Thus, on a low performance or dynamically 
allocated VDI system, the behaviour and timing of some of the 
concurrent remote sessions may affect the performance of the 
other sessions, which in turn will affect user-mode applications. 
Given VDI requirements, keystroke-based identification and 
authentication are well suited for transparent authentication in 
remote desktop applications, as it does not require specialized 
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equipment and the login credentials of each user can be also 
used for biometric authentication. While its inherent noise 
characteristics make it a less suitable candidate for single factor 
authentication, it represents the ideal option for continuous 
authentication throughout the session, especially in the case of 
a session hijack attack.  
Biometric identification systems typically follow three 
processing steps: acquisition, template generation and 
matching. 
1. Acquisition: raw data is captured with a respective 
technique.  
2. Template generation: the acquired scanned content 
must be stored for procession. On this stage the filtration 
is performed on extraneous information stored content to 
isolate the uniquely differentiating characteristics of the 
biometric attribute, and the template is created. The 
template is a mathematical representation of a biometric 
data and often refers to user profile.  
3. Matching: the processed sample is cross-compared 
with the stored reference template in the database. 
Identification and authentication are successful if a match 
is found, else the user is classified as an impostor. 
During the acquisition step, the raw data is recorded in real 
time, while the respective user types, as a collection of timing 
parameters, which are then processed and converted into 
attributes, to be used for authenticating or identifying the user. 
From the intrusiveness perspective, there are two types of user 
input when performing keystroke dynamics: fixed- and free-
text. In fixed-text authentication, a user needs to type a 
predefined phrase in order to have their biometric 
characteristics collected and evaluated, and subsequently be 
allowed to access system; the most common form of this type 
of data is when an user enters their login ID and password. In 
free-text authentication, the user may type any text, including 
command keys, hotkeys, arrows, which makes the method ideal 
for continuous authentication to be run transparently in the 
background while the user is interacting with the system. In this 
case, the user enters arbitrary text as desired or a long text string 
of 500–1000 characters. The reference model, or template 
associated with the user, is created on the second step and 
reflects the unique style of typing. It is stored for subsequent 
authentication, and would require entering text either several 
times if a fixed-text input form is used or once when using the 
free-text form.  
The most significant attributes extracted when a person types 
are digraph-specific (see Fig.2): the time interval between 
pressing and releasing a specific key (dwell time), and the time 
between releasing and pressing two successive keys “AB” 
(flight time). These functions, along with several others, are 
used to build a model of how a person types. While it is not 
designed to be the main authentication technique, the use of a 
biometric method provides an additional level of security for 
the system since it would not be sufficient for the attacker to 
have the access password, they would also be required to enter 
it in the same way the valid user entered it during enrolment and 




Fig.2. Keystroke dynamics attributes. 
 
Other attributes can also be captured [12], they could be 
device-based or network-based. Examples of features for 
keystroke dynamics (during entering to device/system) 
extraction are file system and registry, mouse dynamics, the 
duration of password typing, the use of “invisible keys”, system 
process, browser, flow-based features. 
III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Prior research in remote display and thin client functionality 
highlighted that network latency and virtualization overheads 
(due to the shared resources) are the main factors that affect 
remote display performance and the overall Quality of 
Experience (QoE),  starting with the analysis made by Park and 
Kenyon in [6], which shows that network latency affects the 
timing characteristics of the provided service and, thus, the 
quality perceived by the user. This line of research was later on 
followed by Simoens et al. in [13], where the authors noted the 
correlation between the network data packetization overhead 
and the delay of user input events in remote display. To reduce 
this delay, the paper proposed an input buffering approach, 
leading to bandwidth savings up to 78%, while keeping the 
average user perceived responsiveness below 150ms. Triyason 
et al. in [35] also identified the impact of the remote display 
screen size on the user QoE in cloud-based environments. 
A number of other studies [14,15,16] benchmarked how 
network latency impacts on the perceived performance in 
multiplayer Internet games, more specifically how delays in 
interaction affect the movement, location, and actions of a 
player. Three implementations of remote display protocols 
(Microsoft RDP, Teraddici PCoIP and Blast) were investigated 
in [7] to compare the screen image on the VDI client side, which 
is what the end user actually sees, with the screen on the remote 
side, given two different network speeds. The authors proposed 
a quality score and identified that the implementation of RDP 
and network speed in VDI environment both had an impact on 
the quality degradation. On the authentication performance, the 
study by Antal et. al [17] measured the impostor detection 
performance of a proposed machine learning model focusing on  
mouse dynamics using a dataset collected from a real 
organization, but the experiment was LAN-based and the 
network characteristics of the VDI were not taken into account. 
The study aimed to identify illegally used accounts by using 
time-series data of mouse movements of multiple users working 
in VDI. It showed that behavioural biometric technology based 
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The area of keystroke authentication has been extensively 
investigated by prior research, but the main focus has been 
system-based. This is partially to do with the maturity of the 
concept, which was proposed and researched in the 2000-2010 
decade, prior to the expansion of cloud/remote connectivity and 
access. A number of studies therefore evaluated existing 
algorithms, aimed to evaluate the entropy quality of the inputs 
and improve it through additional processing, comparatively 
analyzed existing algorithms, or highlighted limitations of the 
encompassing techniques. On the data entropy, M. Lizarraga in 
[18] collected keystroke dynamics from a set of the users, 
created template for each user and then tested the similarity 
across templates and samples to determine the efficiency of the 
verification algorithm when user is legitimate and when user is 
an impostor. The method of verification of the similarity was 
developed by authors and based on mean and standard deviation 
of each feature. The three key interaction features extracted 
(down-down, down-up, and up-down times) were a variant of 
the ones mentioned in Fig.1. Further, in [19], the authors 
created a benchmarking dataset from 16 different users and 
evaluated five different authentication algorithms. The raw 
input (consisting of a fixed password across three sessions) was 
used to build a biometric template (enrolment vector) which 
was then compared with two test vectors against the 
investigated algorithms. The template included only key 
timings information (also similar to the ones summarized in 
Fig.2) but, as the experiment was system-based, no network or 
environmental conditions were taken into account. Similarly, 
[20] observed the timing values from 10 users when entering 
the same password/username pair. The flight and hold time for 
each user were analysed and showed the difference of the user’s 
biometric behaviour, some users typed text faster, some slower. 
Variations of this approach were attempted later on by [21, 22] 
by using timing characteristics of the keystroke as pressing 
time, dwell time and total time of password entering and 
calculating mean times for the respective interactions. If the 
value is above the threshold value, then access can be grated, 
otherwise access is denied. In both papers the users were 
required to enter only password for collecting biometric pattern.  
In parallel with fixed-text methods, the studies summarised  
by [23] and [24] evaluated non-static biometric techniques 
based on free-text typing dynamics in order to determine their  
applicability for continuous authentication. The user typing 
profiles were obtained using of digraph-specific measures, and 
in [23] Impostor Pass Rate (IPR) and False Alarm Rates (FAR) 
indicated that the technique may indeed be applied as part of a 
multi-factor authentication system; also, the dynamic 
calculation allows it to work effectively even when a long time 
has passed since the reference user profiles were formed.  
Studies by Gunetti et al. [23] and Araujo et al. [18] used 
distance, measured in deviation units between the pattern and 
the sample, to evaluate and discuss performance metrics. 
Gunetti normalised the means and standard deviations for 
distances between keystroke samples to [0;1] float values in 
order to understand how each of them can be used to separate 
keystroke samples, as well as their influence on FAR and FRR 
[23]. Araujo followed a similar approach in the [0;10] interval 
and visually demonstrated the separation between keystroke 
samples of two subjects [18]. Both studies showed that 
difference between average of distances measure of two users 
is at least 10%. Given their conclusion, if experiments indicate 
an impact of RDP latency to distance metric is greater or equal 
to 10%, then we may conclude that FAR, FRR would be also 
affected. 
The entropy of keystroke data was further investigated in 
[25], more specifically the feasibility of using keystrokes for 
creating cryptography key for files stored remotely in the cloud 
as alternative to the algorithmic key generation. The key based 
on the biometry provides both authentication and integrity of 
data. The work showed the reliability of creating a 256-bit key 
using a biometric pattern – while the noise of the data led to a 
relative weak absolute accuracy, the results also showed very 
low FAR which made the method appropriate for usage as a 
secondary method for MFA.  
The success of keystroke authentication depends on the 
stability of typing characteristics over time. In order to 
determine how timing variations affect its effectiveness, [26] 
presents the results of static manipulation with a dataset of 
collected keystroke dynamics. The time related features were 
extracted from the dataset, VKF is calculated based on the 
typing speed. Using Genetic Algorithm and Support Vector 
Machines (SVM) algorithms the feature subset selection was 
done from the reduced. Feature reduction rate and FAR were 
calculated using the MATLAB. 
With regards to cloud-based usage of biometric 
authentication, in [27] the authors used 36 features to form a 
user profile. Keystroke activity was one of the input parameters 
for creating a user template together other host-based 
characteristic and network flow-based features, but only two 
features were used to describe keystroke activity of the user:  
the key press-down time and the time interval between two 
pressed keys. 
To conclude, there have been significant research efforts to 
determine the feasibility, stability, and applicability of using 
keystroke dynamics for authentication. However, there have 
been only isolated, limited attempts to investigate how network 
impairments, delay and packet loss in particular, may affect the 
effectiveness of authentication using free-text keystroke 
biometrics. This paper aims to improve on the prior research by 
investigating the impact of network and host characteristics on 
the user biometric profile based on keystroke dynamics and to 
derive the threshold for delay variation beyond which the 
underlying behavioural biometric algorithms become 
ineffective. 
IV. METHODOLOGY 
According to the NIST information security guidelines [28], the 
deployment of information system components with minimal 
functionality, such as thin clients, potentially reduces the 
likelihood of information exposure and successful attacks, 
hence are indeed a good option for maintain a security perimeter 
while also providing remote access. However, from a security 
architecture perspective, a thin client, given it resides outside 
the security perimeter of the organization, it is not required to 
have built-in security controls for authentication. This does 
create a vulnerability as compromised thin clients may lead to 
attackers gaining access mid-session to the remote desktop host, 
unless authentication is continuously validated.  In this context, 
the necessary VDI scenario is one where the system performs 
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continuous, transparent authentication and user access control 
on the Virtual Remote Desktop side, as depicted in Fig.1. This 
requires the keystroke pattern to be captured and verified on the 
remote session computer rather than on the thin client 
computer.  
As mentioned in the literature survey section, a number of 
prior studies, including [26] identified that variations in the 
characteristics of typing do affect the accuracy of keystroke 
dynamics. However, the approach of existing research was to 
analyse the variations due to inconsistency in user behaviour 
rather than external parameters. We are therefore proposing to 
investigate whether variation in network latency can introduce 
noise into the keystroke timings to the extent that it would 
render it ineffective. The null hypothesis of this study is that 
network latency has no effect on the consistency of behaviour 
pattern calculated based on keystroke dynamics of user input. 
As part of the experimental approach, we used the input 
rendering engine for thin client, implemented several 
algorithms to calculate biometric pattern from real input 
keystroke dynamics in a VDI session, and then calculated the 
Euclidean distance between the user reference and current 
biometric pattern. In order to comprehensively investigate the 
impact of the external factors, we aim to take into account 
network protocol, network load, running processes on the 
remote host and observe their effects on the resulting keystroke 
dynamics biometric pattern and subsequently on the 
verification of the user profile. We acknowledge that other 
methods, such as machine learning algorithms or neural 
networks, may have different accuracy results versus Euclidian 
distance, but including actual identification or verification 
process is outside the scope of this work. 
A. Dataset 
For comparative and reference purposes, the dataset of 
natural human-computer interaction chosen for the analysis was 
dataset from [29] which includes keystrokes dynamics of 39 
users and three typing patterns of each user, resulting into a total 
of 122 typed keystrokes to be used as input data for creating 
user profile. This reference profile will be compared with 
current user profile that is captured under different network and 
host performance. The dataset contains keystroke-timing 
information from three different passwords, free-text questions 
(500 chars) and the transcript of Steve Jobs’ Commencement 
Speech split into two parts. Each user performed the typing test 
in two separate laboratory sessions, with each session taking 
about one hour and containing approximately ten thousand 
keystrokes. Each keystroke sample is represented as  𝐾𝑢,𝑗 =
{𝑘1(𝑢, 𝑗), 𝑘2(𝑢, 𝑗), . . , 𝑘𝑛(𝑢, 𝑗) } where 𝑢 is a user, 𝑗 is a number 
of samples; 𝑛 is an amount of the keystrokes in the sample 𝑗 of 
the user 𝑢. Each file in dataset contains multiple records with 
user ID and three features. Each keystroke 𝑘𝑖(𝑢, 𝑗), where 𝑖 ≤
𝑛 included the following parameters: 
1) user identifier – an index u, where  𝑢 = 1,39̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , representing 
the user ID;  
2) key state of the key – boolean k, where 0 means key 
pressed; 1 means key released;  
3) key code - 𝑐𝑖(𝑢, 𝑗) represented in ASCII code; 
4) timestamps - 𝑡𝑑𝑖(𝑢, 𝑗) and 𝑡𝑢𝑝𝑖(𝑢, 𝑗) key press or release 
respectively by “a” feature, expressed in miliseconds. 
The pressing and releasing of the keystroke can be represented 
as (u, “0”, 𝑐𝑖 , 𝑡𝑑𝑖) and (u, “1”, 𝑐𝑖 , 𝑡𝑢𝑝𝑖) respectively, where 𝑖 
is keystroke. 
B. Keystroke Replication 
The dataset from [29] was used as input to use a reference 
input and to allow comparison of the results with the prior 
research. For consistency purposes, the dataset samples were 
replayed in order to emulate user typing on the thin client side 
but then transferred using RDP to the remote machine. We used 
the parameters from section above as raw input and wrote a 
small routine to generate input events by using the Windows 
API keybd_event function. We randomly selected an user and 
random sequence of 122 typed keystrokes that represents about 
15 seconds of typing. The dataset samples of this randomly 
selected user were therefore replayed 40 times on host machine, 
transferred by RDP to the target remote machine, then the 
timing measures of the typing events was recorded into a new 
dataset using another Windows API routine. During the 
transmission of the text, a number of network- and system-
based applications were run to emulate concurrent activity. The 
approach used may seem over-engineered in comparison to 
introducing noise directly into the input timing sequence, but 
we aimed to have an accurate end-to-end emulation of the 
network effects rather than a synthetic addition of them; also, 
there have been very few studies looking at how accurately 
keystrokes timing is reproduced following RDP transmissions 
through network environments with variable levels of 
congestion  
C. Feature Extraction 
In order to verify the impact of external impairments on the 
effectiveness of keystroke authentication, we selected a 
recognised, successful method and applied it to both the raw 
initial dataset and the new dataset, based on the received 
keystroke events. We followed the studies [18, 30] and used 
digraph latency for feature extraction. Features were computed 
for each key-pair (𝑘𝑖 , 𝑘𝑖+1) using two main values, specifically 
the press time (P) and the release time (R) of each key in 
milliseconds. Four keystroke features were extracted from each 
key-pair for each user as shown in Fig.3:  
1) Press-Release Time: Hold time for a key 𝑘𝑖  that define the 
time the key remains pressed and represented as a vector 
𝑃𝑅𝑖(𝑢, 𝑗) =  {𝑝𝑟1(𝑢, 𝑗), 𝑝𝑟2(𝑢, 𝑗), . . , 𝑝𝑟𝑛(𝑢, 𝑗)}, where 
𝑝𝑟𝑖(𝑢, 𝑗) = 𝑡𝑢𝑝𝑖(𝑢, 𝑗) − 𝑡𝑑𝑖(𝑢, 𝑗)   for 𝑖 ∈ 𝑛𝑗,𝑢 
2) Press-Press Time: Time interval between pressing two 
successive keys (𝑘𝑖 , 𝑘𝑖+1). This feature is represented by 
𝑃𝑃𝑖(𝑢, 𝑗) =  {𝑝𝑝1(𝑢, 𝑗), 𝑝𝑝2(𝑢, 𝑗), . . , 𝑝𝑝𝑛 (𝑢, 𝑗)}, where 
𝑝𝑝𝑖(𝑢, 𝑗) =  𝑡𝑑𝑖+1(𝑢, 𝑗) − 𝑡𝑑𝑖(𝑢, 𝑗) for 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛, where 𝑛 is 
an amount of the keystrokes in the sample 𝑗 of the user 𝑢. 
3) Release-Release Time: The interval between releasing two 
successive keys (𝑘𝑖 , 𝑘𝑖+1), a composite keystroke latency 
feature defined as 𝑅𝑅𝑖(𝑢, 𝑗) =
 {𝑟𝑟1(𝑢, 𝑗), 𝑟𝑟2(𝑢, 𝑗), . . , 𝑟𝑟𝑛(𝑢, 𝑗)}, where 𝑟𝑟𝑖(𝑢, 𝑗) =
 𝑡𝑢𝑝𝑖+1(𝑢, 𝑗) − 𝑡𝑢𝑝𝑖(𝑢, 𝑗).  
 
 




Fig.3.  Timing features for the key pair  
 
4) Release-Press Time: The interval between releasing and 
pressing two successive keys (𝑘𝑖 , 𝑘𝑖+1), and is represented 
as 𝑅𝑃𝑖(𝑢, 𝑗) =  {𝑟𝑝1(𝑢, 𝑗), 𝑟𝑝2(𝑢, 𝑗), . . , 𝑟𝑝𝑛−1(𝑢, 𝑗)}, 
where 𝑟𝑝𝑖(𝑢, 𝑗) =  𝑡𝑑𝑖+1(𝑢, 𝑗) − 𝑡𝑢𝑝𝑖(𝑢, 𝑗). This value 
could be positive or negative according to when keystroke 
𝑘𝑖+1 was pressed, before or after 𝑘𝑖+1 was released. That is 
why we will use absolute value of this feature |𝑅𝑃𝑖|. 
 
It is apparent only three of the four parameters are 
independent but, given there was no post-processing applied to 
the data, the full set of four was maintained for completeness. 
Before feature extraction, the dataset was ordered by 
grouping records from dataset according to the keystroke value 
ci that first pressed and then released. The adjacency class was 
introduced as an input to set the level of adjacency between two 
keys on the keyboard followed by the study of Alsultan and 
Warwick [23]. This adjacency class allows to decrease the 
deviation of the time values during feature extraction. Each row 
was labelled by the class parameter that corresponds to one of 
the five adjacency classes and related to key-pair (ki, ki+1). 
Then, a row in the ordered dataset will have view (ci, 𝑡𝑑𝑖, 𝑡𝑢𝑝𝑖, 
label). This ordered dataset was used for the extraction of the 
timing features presented earlier and in Fig.4. For each feature 
(PR, PP, RR, RP) the mean value was calculated in accordance 
with the adjacency class to what the key-pair (ki, ki+1) was 
belonged. 
Using the extracted features of the reference template 
𝐾(𝑢, 𝑗), a user pattern is created for a particular typing session, 
consisting of mean time characteristics for 121 digraphs 
(corresponds to 122 characters). Each vector consists of 20 float 
values of the respective features. 
 
𝐾(𝑢, 𝑗)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = (
𝑃𝑅1 𝑃𝑃1 𝑅𝑅1 𝑅𝑃1
𝑃𝑅2 𝑃𝑃2 𝑅𝑅2 𝑅𝑃2
. . . . . . . .
𝑃𝑅𝑖 𝑃𝑃𝑖 𝑃𝑅𝑖 𝑅𝑃𝑖
)                     (1) 
 
where 𝑗 is number of template samples (in our case j=1), 𝑖 is 
adjacency class (𝑖 = 1. .5). 
The current template 𝐾′(𝑢, 𝑗) is calculated the same way on 
the remote machine as reference template. To compare the 
similarity of two templates 𝐾(𝑢, 𝑗) and 𝐾′(𝑢, 𝑗), we calculate 
the Euclidean distance ∆𝐾𝐾′ between the two vectors across 
the X=20 dimensions: 
 
∆𝐾𝐾′ =  √∑ (𝐾(𝑢, 𝑗) − 𝐾′(𝑢, 𝑗))2𝑋𝑥=1                     (2) 
 
There are two approaches to calculate distance with several 
features for the authentication purpose. First way is to calculate 
distance for summative vector with all features that corresponds 
to the user profile, another way is to calculate distance value for 
each feature separately. The determination of the threshold is 
an important issue in the methodology. The analysis of the real 
collected keystroke data needs to be done to determine 
thresholds. The earlier works [18,30] showed that a user’s 
feature with a higher variation demands a lower threshold, 
while a feature with a lower variation demands a higher 
threshold. So, the threshold for each feature in each account is 
obtained based on its standard deviation. Decision about an 
optimal threshold for each feature based on the a priori 
knowledge of authentication system administrator and usually 
the task of determination of the threshold is simple linear 
function maxima problem. In our work we do not consider 
decision-making part of the matching phase, the user’s 
identification and authentication is out of scope. We only use 
distance value as indicator for changes that happened with 
keystroke pattern under certain conditions with variety of 
network and host characteristics.  
V.  EXPERIMENTS 
To identify how traffic intensity and remote host 
characteristics influence the keystroke template vector, we 
implemented a testbed that emulates congestion and associated 
network impairments, consisting of two computers 
communicating via the Microsoft RDP protocol, which was 
chosen due to its popularity and availability. Two machines, 
acting as RDP client and RDP server, were connected via two 
routers over a serial link with a variable speed, adjustable via 
the bitrate of the link. The keystrokes were introduced on the 
RDP client from the dataset described above and the keystroke 
event timings were then collected on the RDP server. We ran 
the D-ITG traffic generator, described by [31] and available for 
download from [32], on the testbed to introduce variable traffic 
intensity that influences routers queues utilization [33]. D-ITG 
controls the amount of generated traffic by varying two 
parameters: C, which represents the intensity of added traffic in 
packets/sec and c, which defines the packet size in bytes. The 
resulting additional traffic and implicit level of congestion do 
affect the timings of the received keyboard events to the extent 
that they may be significantly far, from a Euclidian distance 
perspective, from the original events.  
A. Types of Experiments 
Three types of the experiment to introduce variable network 
conditions were conducted as part of the methodology: cross-
traffic leading to network congestion and increased network 
latency, transmission of files between the remote desktop server 
and the host, affecting the RDP host processing, and streaming 
a video on the remote desktop, which impacts both the CPU 
availability on the RDP host and the network characteristics. In 
the first type of experiment, the transmission channel was 
loaded with constant bit rate (CBR) UDP concurrent traffic; the 
traffic consisted of two streams of the equal bitrate and the 
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channel capacity was reduced to 1mbps. To establish the 
baseline behaviour, the network characteristics were initially 
measured in the absence of cross-traffic, then a first round of 
experiments was performed by varying the C parameter in D-
ITG; three separate experiments were included - first gradually 
between 10 and 100 packets/second, then fixed at 110 
packets/second and 115 packets/second. A separate round of 
experiments included a combination of traffic and host-based 
activities, experiment 5 corresponds to the conditions of the 
experiment 3 but with some activity on the remote display such 
as random fast moving of window with open application, in our 
case, moving of open window with File Explorer, then a parallel 
file download and video streaming. The file download and 
video streaming were run over 100Mbps network. For the file 
download, a large file was downloaded from the RDP server by 
the RDP client and video streaming used a fullHD Youtube 
video being played on the RDP server and viewed on the RDP 
client. A summary of the conditions for each experiment is 












1 1 1 1 1 100 100 
Additional 
activities 







To ensure the statistical significance of the results, each of 
the seven experiments was repeated 40 times and the results 
were averaged. While the range of replicated conditions and 
environments does not provide an exhaustive list of 
impairments, it provides a number of typical cases that users are 
likely to encounter as part of their RDP interaction. 
B. Results 
In order to determine the impact of cross-traffic and host-
based activities, we calculated the Euclidean distance between 
the initial vector and the vector collected at the RDP receiver, 
as affected by the respective interactions. The purpose of this 
study is not to provide a binary evaluation of specific 
algorithms or their behaviour when faced with impairments, but 
to determine the level of impact of these impairments on the 
keystroke dynamics. Given the majority of keystroke 
authentication methods are ultimately reverting to an evaluation 
of how close the measured sequence is to the stored profile, we 
feel that the Euclidian distance, while it not a complete match 
for a specific method, defines the level of this impact. 
Table II below summarises the results of the experiments 
performed. 
As shown by the first three experiments, the impact of low or 
medium congestion is minimal on the resulting keystroke 
dynamics parameters, as the Euclidian distance of experiments 
2 and 3 is comparable to the baseline obtained in experiment 1. 
In the case of experiment 3, the measured average bitrate was 
901 kb/s; this is close to the bottleneck bandwidth for the 
testbed, but the results indicate that it had minimal impact on 
the Euclidian distance between the original vector and the one 
collected at the RDP server. Although the channel utilisation 
was rather high, there was no packet loss recorded and the 
average delay (10.5ms) and jitter (3.2ms) were also low. In 
order to see the behaviour of the channel under heavy 
congestion, the data flows were further increased to an average 
bitrate of 916kb/s, leading to a bottleneck link utilisation of 
91.7% and subsequently increasing the average delay (370ms); 
given the additional traffic was CBR, the jitter varied only 
slightly, increasing to 3.7ms. The overall dynamics of the 
distance value when varying the network latency parameters are 
summarised in Fig.4.  
TABLE II 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 


















Av. packet loss 
[%] 
0 0 0 3.6 0.14 0 0 
Average 
delay [ms] 
<1 <10 10.5 370 64 n/a n/a 
 
The last three experiments involved a combination of RDP-
based interaction, RDP-based traffic, and bandwidth 
limitations. Experiment 5 was similar to the original conditions, 
running through a limited 1Mbps bandwidth, but included 
additional activity on the remote display, more specifically 
random fast window movements for an open application. This 
affected slightly the average delay, increasing it to 64 ms, but 
had a slightly more significant impact on jitter (7ms) and packet 
loss, which increased to 0.14%. While none of the individual 
parameters increased significantly, the resulting Euclidian 
distance varied by a significant factor of 1.77.  
 
Fig.4. Performing the similarity of keystroke dynamics pattern under different 
network latency. 
 
Experiments 6 and 7 also investigated the impact of 
additional RDP activities onto the keystroke timings, but using 
a non-restricted 100Mbps link.  For experiment 6, a text file was 
transmitted from the remote machine to the client machine via 
RDP, while experiment 7 generated additional traffic by 
streaming a video from the remote machine to the thin client. 
Both activities could potentially be equally disruptive; TCP is 
the transport protocol for bulk data transfer and is meant to be 
a conservative and network-friendly, but also has the ability to 
expand to the available bandwidth in order to maximise its 
efficiency. The video chosen for experiment 7 was an HD 
1080p video, with bitrates varying between 4000-8000kbps 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AWKzr6n0ea0); while 
this is indeed the bitrate between the YouTube server and the 
RDP server, optimised for the bandwidth between the two 
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endpoints, not the same can be said about the link between the 
RDP server and the client, which uses non-optimised video 
communication between them. As a result, it is likely that the 
down-streaming from the server to the client is higher in terms 
of bitrate. 
To determine the significance of results for experiments, we 
performed series of tests where we calculated the Euclidean 
distance between the initial vectors of two random users K(u), 
K´(u) collected at the thin client computer after keystroke 
replication process. The average value for Euclidean distance 
was equal to 8.5 for two absolutely different users. If we 
compare the result with the resulting distance after experiment 
1 without additional traffic, we may conclude that VDI testbed 
adds 12% of distortion into the distance measure of synthetic 
keystrokes, high network latency (experiments 3-5) adds 15%-
20% of distortion, and RDP overheads (experiments 6 and 7) 
add 28%-38% of distortion to Euclidean distance. 
C. Discussion 
The results showed that increasing the channel load with 
UDP traffic to a certain level does not affect the biometric 
pattern. This could be explained by the fact that UDP traffic is 
non-bursty, smooth, and the standard deviation and jitter values 
are relatively small. But when the channel utilization goes 
beyond 0.9 (as it is the case for experiments 3-5) the throttling 
algorithm is starting to work causing a packet loss. This affects 
the keystroke pattern and the similarity coefficient changes 
from 1 to 1.7 even with small packet loss values of 0.15-0.5%. 
The keystroke dynamics pattern is also affected by the value 
of standard deviation and jitter, as demonstrated where the 
transmission of RDP keyboard events is concurrent with events 
from the VDI. In this case, the average delay was within normal 
limits but the deviation in delay values was almost two times 
greater (100 msec). From this, we can conclude that such an 
effect will be caused by applications running on TCP, since 
TCP traffic is characterized as bursty, greedy, and is more 
resistant to delays, but has large jitter values due to its nature. 
When the network load approaches bandwidth the network 
latency increases to an unacceptable 370 msec (ITU-T 
recommendation for UDP traffic network latency is less than 
150 ms) and packet loss occurs. This leads to a modification of 
the timing information required for user current biometric 
pattern, as a result, the similarity coefficient has a very large 
distance value which means that the user is most likely not to 
be identified. 
Additional actions such as copying and watching videos on 
the remote display also significantly affect the keystroke pattern 
which means that biometrics dynamics are transmitted with the 
same priority as the rest of the traffic and are served in a queue. 
From this we can conclude that continuous authentication will 
be not effective in this situation. 
Not prioritizing of RDP messages that carry biometric 
information can be explained by the fact related to the 
functioning/processing of keyboard events. Keyboard messages 
often have a low priority over other operations such as file 
management [34]. This is apparent when typing in a word 
processor. If there is any disk activity when typing, the text 
being written is held in a buffer until such time that the 
processor is free to deal with it (causing the display to pause 
and then the characters appearing). In order to achieve the high 
accuracy of timing between keystrokes, the keyboard driver and 
timing device need a high priority in order not to be affected by 
other activities. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper investigated the impact of network traffic and 
transport infrastructure constraints on the behaviour of the 
keystroke pattern in the remote desktop applications and VDI. 
The variation in the keystroke pattern was estimated by 
measuring the Euclidian distance, which is at the core of 
matching algorithms that are based on the distance between 
reference user profile and the current user profile. 
A raw dataset was converted to a more descriptive set of four 
timing features (PR, PP, RR, and RP) that was used as input for 
the experiments. This resulting profile was then compared with 
the timing patterns obtained when exposing the RDP 
communication channel to increasing network latency or/and 
additional traffic, such as transmission of files from the remote 
desktop to the host or streaming a video from the remote 
desktop. In order to avoid bias due to the adaptiveness of the 
underlying biometric algorithm, the resulting profiles were 
compared using Euclidean distance that is a metric in instance-
based learning algorithms such as k-nearest neighbours (KNN) 
algorithm. 
Following from the results of the experiments, we found that 
the user timing pattern is not affected by network latency, but 
standard deviation, jitter, and packet loss have a significant 
combined impact onto it. This suggests that, in spite of the 
apparent network-unfriendly nature of UDP, working with 
applications that require TCP transmission on the remote 
desktop is likely to have a greater effect on the pattern than UDP 
based ones. It can also be concluded that RDP does not 
prioritise its encompassing data flows, which means that any 
competing traffic is likely to render keystroke dynamics 
unusable for continuous authentication for remote access. For 
one-time authentication at the beginning of the session it is 
possible to use keystroke pattern, as long as there are no other 
running applications or open windows that can affect the 
timing.  
In a continuous authentication system using behavioural 
biometrics, the key role of the acquisition module is to ensure 
one of the four requirements to biometric data - permanence and 
immunity to circumvention for the keystrokes. As this study 
demonstrates, the combination of the RDP protocol and a 
typical network environment may have an effect on this 
requirement, which subsequently may impact the FAR, FRR 
parameters of the biometric systems based on keystroke 
dynamics. 
Although it is a small part of it, keystroke is one the two 
(together with mouse movements) inputs for RDP and therefore 
the traffic that carries it should be prioritised to ensure its timely 
arrival. At the time of writing the article, spring 2020, the 
importance of remote working and access has become more 
evident than ever before and, subsequently, biometric 
identification and authentication using keystroke dynamics 
could represent a great solution to improve the security and 
control of remote access. 
For future work, we plan to focus more on studying the 
influence of network characteristics, such as standard deviation 
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and jitter on the keystroke dynamics pattern, as well as TCP 
traffic. We also plan to experiment with other remote display 
protocols and remote desktop applications as AWS PCoiP, and 
Citrix ICA, Microsoft Teams. 
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